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Summary and Key Words 
We designed and implemented participatory computer simulations in three workshops in 
New Zealand’s Upper Waikato catchment to learn how market-based instruments (MBIs) 
might improve freshwater outcomes when managing water and land resources within limits. 
An Excel-based platform was built to simulate, in stakeholder workshops, the use of 
transferable permits and user charges for both water quantity and water quality in the Upper 
Waikato catchment. Each participant managed a hypothetical property in a simplified 
catchment that included seven farms, a pulp mill, district council, and a hydro-electric 
company. Based on profit schedules and policy settings, participants made choices about 
production intensity, land use change and trading of water and/or nutrient allowances.  
The simulations highlighted the social and cultural context in which MBIs must operate, and 
how that context influences the outcomes that we can expect from MBIs. Participants found 
the simulations to be a valuable learning experience. 
Key words: simulation, water trading, discharge trading, water quality, market-based 
instruments 
1. Introduction 
Market-based instruments (MBIs), sometimes referred to as economic instruments, refer to 
policies that use markets or other financial incentives to achieve desired outcomes, and 
include a wide variety of possible measures – see Box 1. These include policies that create 
new markets for environmental goods and services, taxes and charges on resource use and 
pollution, policies requiring that adverse effects be offset or otherwise mitigated, and liability 
for damage to the environment. 
There is a substantial literature, both theoretical and applied, on the potential and actual use 
of MBIs, including in freshwater management (see e.g. Breetz et al., 2005; Fenemor and 
Sinner, 2005; Fenemor, 2007; Grafton et al., 2011; Greenhalgh and Selman, 2011a; 
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Greenhalgh and Selman, 2011b; Kerr and Lock, 2009; MacDonald et al., 2004; PCE, 2006; 
Robb et al., 2001; Schelling, 1983; Selman et al., 2009; Shortle, 2012; Sinner and Salmon, 
2003; Sinner et al., 2005; Tisdell, 2011; UNEP, 2004). Sinner and Salmon (2003) noted a 
lack of clarity in the RMA and Local Government Act regarding the use of MBIs, especially 
those that involve charges; this situation is largely unchanged. 
The Government’s Fresh Start for Fresh Water (FSFW) envisages that a broad toolkit is 
needed to improve water management in New Zealand, potentially including MBIs operating 
within a well-designed regulatory framework. This paper examines how transferable (or 
tradeable) permits and water charges could be designed for inclusion within Resource 
Management Act policy to deliver those improved water management outcomes.  
2. Methodology 
We used participatory computer simulations in six stakeholder workshops, plus interviews 
with participants and water sector 
stakeholders, to learn how appropriately 
designed market-based instruments might 
improve outcomes when managing 
catchment water and land resources within 
limits. Two Excel-based simulation 
platforms were built. The first case 
simulated water allocation in a notional 
Hawke’s Bay catchment. The second 
simulated MBIs for water quantity and 
water quality together, for a case study in 
the Upper Waikato catchment. This paper 
reports on the Upper Waikato case study 
only. 
For the simulations, each participant was 
assigned an enterprise (irrigated or dryland 
farm, industrial water user, council water 
supplier, or hydro-electric operator). 
Based on profit schedules relating 
enterprise operations with water use – and 
in the Waikato case, nutrient losses – and 
based on policy and weather settings for 
that scenario, each participant made choices about land use change and buying or selling 
water and/or nutrient allowances. At the end of each round the individual and catchment 
outcomes of those decisions were reported: allowance allocations, land use, water use, 
nutrient use, river condition, profit, trading volumes and prices. 
Data derived from the simulations were complemented with results of discussions with 
participants about their attitudes and understanding of MBIs and reasons for their decisions in 
Box 1: Types of Market-Based Instrument 
 
Market-creation techniques 
 Tradeable emission permits 
 Tradeable development rights 
 Tradeable water allowances 
 Individual transferable fishing quota 
 
Prices, taxes and charges 
 Differential pricing 
 Emission charges and discharge fees 
 Differential tax treatment 
 User fees 
 Financial contributions 
 
Compensation mechanisms 
 Offsets 
 Mitigation banks 
 
Liability mechanisms 
 Deposit-refund schemes 
 Performance bonds 
 Mandatory insurance 
 Legal liability for damage 
 
 
each simulation. Pre- and post-workshop interviews were completed, as well as interviews 
with additional tangata whenua, farmer groups and regional council staff. Because the 
simulations are a simplification of reality, with less uncertainty and with decision-making 
geared towards profit maximisation, the discussion and interviews provided a broader canvas 
for evaluation of transferable permits and water charging. 
3. The simulated catchment 
For purposes of simulating policy scenarios, we developed a simplified model of the Upper 
Waikato as shown in Figure 1, with two hydro lakes and their catchments. The simulations 
included limits on abstractions and on nitrogen and phosphorus discharges (both point and 
diffuse sources) for Catchment 1 and limits for combined abstractions and discharges in 
Catchments 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1. A simplified model of the Upper Waikato, with two hydro lakes and their catchments, 
used for simulations. 
Because point sources (a pulp and paper mill and Tokoroa municipality) are important 
sources of both nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the Waikato River, we included both of 
these entities in the simulations. Similarly, the hydroelectric dams are a major feature of the 
Upper Waikato. Water abstracted from the river or its tributaries reduces the amount that 
flows through the turbines in a series of power stations. The simulations included an entity 
with two power stations, one in each catchment. The Appendix provides a brief description of 
each of the enterprises in the simulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Simulation scenarios and participants 
We implemented a number of policy scenarios during the course of three workshops. Some 
scenarios were one round only while others included two or more connected rounds where 
the results of one round determined the starting point for the next. 
All of the scenarios had the following basic features: 
 Both flow (Q) and nutrient (either N or P) limits for each lake catchment as described 
above; Q is assumed to be fully allocated. 
 Initial allocations of both N and Q based on ‘grandparenting’. 
 Downstream transfers of Q and N (or P) permitted between all uses and discharges; 
upstream transfers require approval. 
 The hydro operator is assigned explicit, transferable allowances for a portion of the flow, 
and allowed to buy or sell water allowances to adjust flow through the two dams. 
 Changes of land use incur an annualised conversion cost. 
 Trades are pair-wise and via open-call market and must be recorded by simulation 
manager before they take effect. 
 No banking of Q or nutrients (i.e. no carry forward of unused allocations to following 
round). 
 Compliance is ex ante, i.e. a participant is not allowed to complete a round unless they 
have sufficient permits for their land use selections. 
 
Participants were recruited from within the Waikato catchment and involved farmers (dairy 
and other), staff from a hydroelectric company and a pulp and paper mill, members of local 
Māori organisations and staff from the regional council. Attendance varied; some attended all 
three while others attended only one or two sessions. Members of the project team managed 
properties when there were insufficient stakeholders for all ten properties. Each workshop 
lasted about three hours plus a break for an evening meal. 
5. The first workshop: Upper Waikato #1 
5.1. Workshop scenarios and outcomes 
After familiarising participants with the computer spreadsheets for their properties, the first 
workshop explored gains from trade in permits to take water (‘water permits’), how this 
changed with a cap on nutrient losses from each property, and then how participants managed 
when both water and nutrient permits were tradeable. Most of the seven rounds included 
constraints on how much water and nutrients could be transferred upstream from the 
downstream catchment, to avoid unacceptable effects on upstream river condition. 
Based on economic theory, we expected that reducing the availability of water or nutrients 
would reduce financial returns and that trading would result in increased financial returns, all 
else equal. Constraints on trade (e.g. preventing upstream transfers) were expected to reduce 
returns compared to no constraints on trade. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1 presents the simulation results. In Round 2, as expected, allowing trading of water 
permits enabled a significant increase in financial returns ($24,650 compared to $20,900 in 
Round 1) as entities with surplus water sold allowances to others. This came at the expense of 
water quality as allowances that were unused in Round 1 could now be exercised. The next 
round repeated this scenario but involved a limit on water (quantity) allowances that could be 
transferred upstream, as one way of trying to protect water quality. While nutrient discharges 
were reduced compared to Round 2, with some financial cost (as expected), the reductions 
were insufficient to achieve the ‘good’ river condition built into the simulation design.  
Round 5 introduced nutrient regulation, with no trading of either water or discharge 
allowances. Phosphorus (P) discharges were capped at a level that would ensure that ‘Good’ 
river condition was achieved. Some entities received an allocation of P units that required a 
reduction in land use intensity or, in the case of the district council and pulp mill, investment 
in mitigation options. Financial returns fell to $18,750. 
In Round 6, trading of P was allowed and in Round 7, water trading was reintroduced, in both 
cases with limits on upstream trading. As expected, financial returns increased (to $19,200 in 
Round 6 and $19,900 in Round 7). 
Round 9 repeated Round 7 but with the limit on upstream trading removed. We expected this 
to result in greater financial returns and reduced river condition in the upstream zone, but this 
did not occur. Both participants managing upstream forestry properties decided to stay in 
forestry rather than convert to pastoral farming – one commented later that it was difficult 
and costly to acquire enough P units. 
5.2. Observations from Upper Waikato #1 
Water users are not accustomed to calculating the marginal value of a unit of water or 
nutrient discharge. Even though the simulations had quite simple profit schedules, people 
made mistakes, especially when water and P were both constrained and tradeable. Participant 
comments included: 
Bought too much water – couldn't resell extra, couldn't store and wait for market. 
Sloppy paperwork & market entry very confusing; can lead to costly mistakes. 
 
  
 
 
Table 1: Results from Upper Waikato #1. (Takes and discharges for the Lower River include 
those in the Upper River; some rounds were skipped due to time constraints) 
 
 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 9
Results - Waikato #1
Business As 
Usual
Sleeper 
Permits (1)
Constrained 
Trade
Nutrient 
regulation
Gains from 
Trading P
Gains: Water 
& P
Unconstrain
ed Trading
Water limits 
only. Some 
farms with 
surplus. No 
trading.
Trading 
allowed.
Trading 
allowed, 
upstream 
transfers 
limited.
P limited to 
"good 
practice". No 
trading of 
water or P.
Trading of P 
but not 
water. 
Upstream 
limit.
Trading of P 
& water. 
Upstream 
limit.
Trading of P 
and water. 
No upstream 
limit.
River Quality Upper RiverUpper RiverUpper RiverUpper RiverUpper RiverUpper RiverUpper River
Total takes 3 9 7 2 3 7 5
P discharges 3.7 5 4.4 2.5 3.3 3.4 3
River condition Good Fair Fair Good Good Good Good
Lower RiverLower RiverLower RiverLower RiverLower RiverLower RiverLower River
Total takes 20 27 24 17 17 21 19
P discharges 10.1 12.3 11.8 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.5
River condition Fair Poor Poor Good Good Good Good
Financial outcomes
Total profit: farming 15100 17650 17050 13200 14150 14600 13850
Non-farm entities 5800 7000 6850 5550 5050 5300 4850
Overall outcome 20900 24650 23900 18750 19200 19900 18700
Trading Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price
Water $0 $131 $200 $0 $0 $50 $79
Phosphorus $0 $0 $0 $0 $160 $139 $70
Land Uses
Dairy 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
Sheep/Beef 2 1 2 1 3 2 0
Arable 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Forestry 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
 
 
Participant comments from Upper Waikato #1 
Large corporate entities (pulp mill & hydro) prefer to deal with each other. 
The District Council is charging too much for phosphorus, should take more of a ‘public 
interest’ position. 
Farmers don’t know how much water they’re using. Lots of them are still there for the 
lifestyle, and want to have as little as possible to do with Fonterra, salespersons and the 
council [i.e. are not likely to be interested in trading water]. 
First in, best dressed means you need to get it quick or miss out [re constraint on upstream 
transfers]. 
Gets difficult to keep track of water, P and profits, having bought P allowance, is not clear if 
will get water/vice-versa, therefore, uncertainty in this scenario. … Bought water – can't get 
P, again, limiting factor. Need to buy P first, THEN water! 
Easy to get confused. 
 
 
The value of water declined substantially when P limits were introduced, from $131 and $200 
in Rounds 2 and 4 to only $50 and $79 in Rounds 7 and 9. Participants needing both water 
and P units to intensify typically tried to acquire these as a bundle, and sellers sought to sell 
bundles rather than risk being left with unsold units and insufficient trading revenue to offset 
production changes. This attempt to trade in bundles made it more difficult to conclude 
transactions and made it less clear what the individual units were worth. Those who had to 
buy units separately sometimes found that hard: 
Gets difficult to keep track of water, P and profits. Having bought P allowance, is not 
clear if will get water/vice-versa, therefore, uncertainty in this scenario. 
The restriction on upstream transfers created a rush to complete trades and hence a higher 
price (although it could have just as easily resulted in a lower price if the sellers had been 
more anxious to conclude a trade). A successful buyer was one who was quick at completing 
a trade, not necessarily one who had the most profitable use. As one put it: 
‘First in, best dressed’ means you need to get it quick or miss out. 
Social networks also appeared to influence trading (albeit in an artificial environment). For 
example, participants managing the three dairy farms (all real-life dairy farmers who knew 
each other) tended to discuss possible trades with each other first. Māori participants were 
also approached quickly, with one of the dairy farmers observing that growing experience 
with iwi in various policy and industry settings had reduced barriers to approaching iwi, and 
that iwi were perceived as likely to be interested in mutually-beneficial trading opportunities. 
In some instances, offers to buy or sell from ‘new’ potential trading partners were declined 
 
 
because trades had already been ‘promised’ and/or relationships established that would be 
honoured even if a higher price was offered. 
When a participant sold units for less than the marginal value indicated by their profit 
schedule, other properties designed to have gains from selling units could end up buying 
them, and then not consider the option of selling. Though this would need to be tested, it 
appeared that when evaluating options, participants tended to look first at how to increase 
profits by raising output, and only when this looked infeasible given the high cost of permits 
did they look at reducing output and selling permits. Thus, trading in this instance did not 
necessarily create the most efficient outcome because some permits sold for less than the true 
market value and were purchased by those who put them to sub-optimal use. 
A whiteboard was made available for public posting of bids and was used intermittently, 
usually when there was little prior information about the value of allowances. Players 
generally found it easier to conclude trades without using the board, but they didn’t always 
get the best price. On the other hand, those who posted on the board found that they 
sometimes missed out because others made deals more quickly informally. 
The Hydro operator found it difficult to know whether to buy water permits when there 
appeared to be an excess available, because unused water would remain in the river anyway. 
There was no ‘a priori’ profit-maximising strategy, and participants managing this enterprise 
in different workshops used a range of approaches. A strategy of not buying water backfired 
in one round when it appeared that water would go unused, but then a buyer appeared and 
paid more than it was worth to Hydro (who probably could have purchased it for less a few 
minutes earlier). 
6. The second workshop: UW#2 
6.1. Scenarios and outcomes from UW#2 
The second Waikato workshop explored three issues: initial allocation criteria for nutrient 
discharges (existing use vs. ‘good practice’), the implications of water charges, and the 
potential for a would-be ‘water baron’ to buy up permits and use market power to raise 
permit prices. Participants were required to comply with water and phosphorus allocations in 
all rounds. Trading was also allowed in all rounds, subject to the same constraints on 
upstream transfer as applied in UW#1.  
Based on economic theory, the first three rounds (testing allocation methods and water 
charges) were expected to produce results comparable to Round 7 in UW#1, assuming all 
possible gains from trade were realised. Charges were less than the market value of 
allowances and were thus expected to reduce the price of allowances but not adversely affect 
overall returns (where revenue from charges is treated as a transfer rather than a cost). For the 
scenarios testing market manipulation, we expected that allowance prices would rise in 
Round 5, adversely affecting overall returns, that the putative ‘water baron’ would benefit 
financially from secret information in Round 6, and that returns would fall in Round 7 as 
profitability of land uses fell.  The simulation results are summarised in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Results from Upper Waikato #2. (Round 4 was skipped. Takes and discharges for the 
Lower River include those in the Upper River. Round 7 from UW#1 is included for comparison 
with Round 1.) 
 
 
Round 1 involved allocations based on ‘good practice’ and was a replication of Round 7 of 
UW#1. Compared with UW#1, less development occurred in the upper zone (one property 
stayed in forestry) and, as a consequence, total profits were lower, contrary to expectations. 
This was due to a combination of factors, including unprofitable decisions by one or two 
players that pushed up demand for P and prevented the two forestry properties from 
converting to the extent they had in UW#1, and one lost a considerable sum. Less water was 
used, leading to higher profits for the hydro company, and the paper mill adopted a more 
profitable strategy, but this was not enough to offset the reduction in farming profit. 
In Round 2, farm properties all received equal allocations of water and P, with total allocation 
equal to that in Round 1. This had marked effects on the profitability of different properties, 
W1:Rd7 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7
Results - Waikato #2
Gains from 
trade 
Good practice 
allocation
Average 
allocation
Usage 
charges 
Water & P
Long Term 
Trades
Long Term 
Trades (2)
Long Term 
Trades (3)
All rounds: Upstream limits. Trading 
of P & water. Rounds 5, 6 & 7 were 
connected (multi-round trades 
possible).
Workshop 1, 
Round 7. For 
comparison.
"Good 
practice" 
allocation of 
P.
Equal 
allocation of P 
& water. 
"Good 
practice" 
allocation. 
Charges: 
water $4 & P 
$10.
Connected 
rounds. 
Speculator 
expecting 
price 
increase.
Speculator. 
Higher prices.
Speculator. 
Lower prices.
River Quality Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River
Total takes 7 2 2 2 2 3 2
P discharges 3.4 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.2 2.9
River condition Good Good Excellent Good Good Good Good
Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River
Total takes 21 16 16 16 15 17 18
P discharges 8.4 8 7.5 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.5
River condition Good Good Good Good Good Good Good
Financial outcomes
Total profit: farming 14600 12600 12550 13742 13560 18280 11730
Non-farm net position 5300 5950 5750 6054 6660 6960 6560
Overall outcome 19900 18550 18300 19796 20220 25240 18290
Trading Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price
Water $50 $83 $0 $50 $94 $94 $48
Phosphorus $139 $195 $200 $190 $282 $249 $99
Land Uses
Dairy 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
Sheep/Beef 2 2 3 2 3 3 3
Arable 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Forestry 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
 
 
as both forestry blocks converted to sheep and beef and the ‘best practice’ dairy farm 
intensified. However, the two standard-practice dairy farms with reduced allocations 
suffered, one converting to forestry even though he would have been better off changing to 
best practice. (By spending $200 to purchase one unit of P, he could have converted to best 
practice and still been $1,500 better off.) He also ended up with surplus water and P that he 
did not sell, suggesting that his actions were a protest against the policy of average allocation. 
During discussion, he said that imposing an abrupt change of this nature was unfair; farmers 
should be given time to adapt. On his comment sheet he wrote: 
The P market has become polarised to one end; unable to buy or sell in upper 
catchment; run out of town by regulation. 
Although it should have been possible through trading to achieve the same or better overall 
financial outcomes as Round 1 (distributed differently due to the different initial allocation), 
total profits fell due to the dairy farm that converted to forestry. Had this player converted to 
‘best practice’ dairy instead, total profits in the catchment would have been higher with 
average allocations than the ‘good practice’ allocation in Round 1 (although this was also 
depressed by unprofitable decisions). This is not entirely surprising since the profit schedules 
were such that the moderate-intensity levels were the most profitable given the market value 
of P and water permits. Given this, an average allocation means that most properties have an 
optimal or near-optimal allocation even without trading. 
Round 3 reverted to the allocations of water and P used in Round 1 and introduced charges 
for water use and P discharges. Charges were 5% of the market price from the previous 
round, i.e. $4 per unit of water and $10 per 0.1 kg of P. (No water was traded in Round 2, so 
the Round 1 price was used.) Most participants said after the round that the low charges did 
not influence their decisions, and in fact the total profit was higher than Round 1 ($20,700 
prior to charges, compared to $18,550). The dairy farm player who converted to forestry in 
Round 2 also protested about the charges in Round 3, saying the charges made it uneconomic 
for him to intensify. Discussion revealed, however, that even without the charges the market 
value of P was too high for him to justify buying any. 
Rounds 5 through 7 were presented as an opportunity to explore long-term decisions under 
conditions of price uncertainty; in fact they also involved speculation and market power. 
Participants were able to make multi-round trades and were told that profitability of different 
enterprises was subject to changes in Rounds 6 and 7. The Forestry1 participant was secretly 
advised by the research team that prices were likely to rise by about 30% in the next round: 
For these next few rounds, we would like you to act as a speculator and try to acquire 
permits in the first round, and to reap the benefits of this by selling permits (temporary 
or permanent trades) at a higher price in the next round (e.g. possibly hold some back 
to force up the price). 
Forestry1 was not told, however, that in Round 7 profitability would fall below the starting 
point. In Round 5, s/he only managed to buy 2 units of water and 0.2 kg P, and kept buying in 
 
 
Rounds 6 and 7 to convert to dairy farming rather than selling permits to realise trading 
profits. This proved to be a disastrous strategy when prices dropped in Round 7. 
6.2. Observations from Upper Waikato #2 
Using an average allocation for water and nutrient allowances, as was done in Round 2, is 
clearly controversial as it, unfairly according to participants, creates winners and losers. From 
a purely financial perspective, because farm properties started closer to their optimal 
allocations, the average allocation would have generated higher overall returns if one dairy 
farm had not chosen a protest strategy. In real life, using an average allocation could have 
rather different consequences because of more variable profit schedules, sunk costs in 
existing investments, and the likelihood of imperfect markets for permits. For these reasons, 
in real life an average allocation is less likely to match the financially optimal allocation for a 
catchment. 
The introduction of low-level charges did not reduce profitability and if anything might have 
improved it by motivating participants to sell units that were worth more to someone else. 
Even though the market value of units should have been sufficient to motivate profitable 
trades, it seems some were holding or buying units when they should have sold. It is also 
possible that participants were gaining experience after a few rounds, avoiding the poor 
decisions that were made in Round 1and identifying where the opportunities for gains lie. 
Despite conditions conducive to market manipulation in Rounds 5 through 7, the would-be 
‘water baron’ found it difficult to dominate the market. S/he commented that there wasn’t 
enough time to get round the room to buy up permits in Round 5, and then adopted a different 
strategy for the remaining rounds, which proved very costly. In a small catchment where 
trades are made informally and everyone knows everyone else, market manipulation of this 
nature (‘water barons’) appears unlikely, since one needs to have better information than 
others and be able to translate this into trading profits. In a large catchment, market 
manipulation is likely to be difficult for other reasons, namely the availability of many other 
possible sellers and the fact that future returns to water are uncertain (mainly due to 
fluctuating international commodity markets).   
More generally, UW#2 provided further examples of the difficulty of making and 
implementing profit-maximising choices. In some cases this was simply due to mistakes in 
understanding and executing the available options, but in others it was due to poor price 
transparency and the difficulty of buying or selling bundles of water and P.  
7. The third workshop: UW#3 
7.1. Scenarios and outcomes from UW#3 
The third workshop consisted of five connected rounds, each round notionally representing 
five years, in order to explore issues associated with transition to new policy measures. These 
measures included ‘penalty’ charges on nutrient losses as a transitional measure prior to both 
nitrogen and phosphorus losses being capped at ‘best practice’ levels. Revenue went ‘to fund 
 
 
the activities of the Waikato River Guardians’ but this did not include mitigation measures, 
so river condition was still determined by nutrient losses and water use. The last round 
included an ‘all-in’ auction as a way to maximise market liquidity and encourage all permit 
holders to consider options for reducing nutrient losses. 
The addition of a cap on nitrogen necessitated some changes to the profit schedules. We also 
took the opportunity to respond to participants’ concerns that the schedules overstated the 
financial differences between standard dairy operations and best practice. We made the 
profitability of these two dairy options equivalent (rather than favouring standard practice) 
but retained a conversion cost for adopting best practice. Due to these changes, the financial 
results from UW#3 (see Table 3) are not directly comparable with financial results from the 
previous workshops. 
Expectations were that financial performance would be stable in Rounds 1 and 2, decline in 
Round 3 when nutrient caps were imposed and improve in Round 4 as participants realised 
further opportunities for gains from trade. In theory and with perfect information, the auction 
in Round 5 would not alter the financial results except perhaps to make it easier for 
participants to identify opportunities to gain from trading. In practice, this outcome was 
uncertain given the novelty of the auction and the need for participants to manage multiple 
types of allowances. 
As in the final rounds in UW#2, players were able to make long-term trades and the amount 
transferred upstream was capped. In addition, annualised conversion costs continued into 
subsequent rounds, meaning it would be costly to convert more than once because the 
conversion costs would accumulate. 
Round 1 of UW#3 was ‘business as usual’ with water regulated but not nutrients. Participants 
were notified that both nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) would be capped in Round 3, and 
that in Round 2 there would be a penalty charge on N ($5/kg) and P ($25/.1kg) as an interim 
measure to encourage early reductions. This was charged only on nutrient losses that 
exceeded the ‘best practice’ allocations that each property would receive in Round 3, at 
which point all properties would be charged a low-level charge ($2/kgN and $10/.1kgP) on 
nutrient losses. 
The lack of restrictions on nutrients enabled substantial profits to be made in Round 1, though 
this came at the expense of river quality as two properties converted to dairy farming. In 
Round 2, some properties responded to the penalty charges and adopted mitigation measures 
earlier than required, even though for some it would have been more profitable to wait until 
Round 3. Nutrient discharges declined, though not enough to improve river condition from 
‘Poor’ to ‘Fair’. Results are shown in Table 3. 
  
 
 
 
Table 3: Results from Upper Waikato #3. (Takes and discharges for the Lower River include 
those in the Upper River. Farm and non-farm profit are after charges; ‘Outcome w/o charges’ 
shows total profits ignoring charges.) 
 
 
In Round 3, nutrient losses were capped at levels that ensured ‘Good’ river quality. With this 
came the challenge for participants to optimise across three inputs: water, N and P. Even with 
trading, it proved difficult for participants to secure the desired amount of these inputs and 
profits fell sharply. The price of water remained high even though nutrient allowances were 
now competing for scarce funds. Round 4 provided a chance for further trading and better 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
Results - Waikato #3
Years 1-5: BAU
Years 6-10: BP 
based charges
Years 11-15: 
Nutrient caps
Years 16-20: 
Nutrient caps
Years 21-25: 
Auction
All rounds: Upstream limits. 
Trading allowed. All rounds  
connected (multi-round trades 
possible).
Water limits 
only. Notice of 
charges in 
Round 2;  N & P 
limits in Round 
3.
Charge on N & 
P loss in excess 
of "good 
practice".
Limits and low 
charges on N & 
P.
Repeat previous 
round.
"All-in" auction 
for N units.
River Quality Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River Upper River
Total takes 7 7 3 3 3
P discharges 4.7 4.3 2.5 2.4 3.1
N discharges 230 200 110 100 120
River condition Poor Poor Good Good Good
Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River Lower River
Total takes 18 17 16 16 16
P discharges 7.6 7.4 6 6.1 5.7
N discharges 280 250 220 230 200
River condition Poor Poor Good Good Good
Financial outcomes
Total profit: farming 18850 16600 12110 13925 14475
Non-farm net position 6800 6725 5005 5065 4225
Overall outcome 25650 23325 17115 18990 18700
Charges 0 1475 1510 1510 1520
Outcome w/o charges 25650 24800 18625 20500 20220
Trading Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price Avg price
Water $183 $183 $163 $85 $90
Phosphorus $0 $0 $81 $76 $97
Nitrogen $0 $0 $157 $181 $203
Land Uses
Dairy 5 5 4 4 4
Sheep/Beef 1 1 1 1 2
Arable 1 1 1 1 1
Forestry 0 0 1 1 0
 
 
realisation of the gains of trading. Profits increased and the price of water dropped as it 
became clear that nitrogen was the limiting input in the catchment. 
Round 5 started with an ‘all-in’ uniform price auction for nitrogen allowances. Participants 
were required to put all of their N allowances up for sale and told they would get the revenue. 
This enabled them to buy back their allowances at no net cost. They were told to bid high 
(e.g. $1,000 per 10 kg N) for the number of units they considered they absolutely needed and 
a second, lower price for any units they might be willing to sell or additional units they might 
want to buy. This was challenging for participants, including members of the research team 
who were managing properties in the simulation, since P and water allowances had to be 
transacted after the auction and hence management strategies involved uncertainty. 
The auction cleared at $200 per 10 kg N. One participant (Dairy1) didn’t understand the 
auction and failed to obtain any units, creating pressure to obtain N in the secondary market. 
Meanwhile, Forestry2 went into the auction with no allowances, bought five 10-kg units and 
resold two at $200. Other units sold for between $150 and $200 but, when the round was 
about to close and Dairy1 still needed N, Forestry1 sold him one unit for $500. 
Market prices for units of water, N and P are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Prices ($ per unit) from bilateral transactions for water, phosphorus and nitrogen 
permits in Upper Waikato #3. Round 5 prices do not include the auction for nitrogen permits. 
 
7.2. Observations from Upper Waikato #3 
A dairy farm participant commented that the charges had a strong incentive effect when they 
were a ‘penalty’ for exceeding a certain level (Round 2). Once they applied to all discharges 
(Round 3), this participant said he no longer factored them into decisions. Another participant 
commented that he tends to focus on factors that are highlighted by the decision tools 
available. These comments suggest that MBI settings can have a signalling effect beyond the 
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direct financial incentive. A charge that selectively targets high discharges implies that these 
are socially unacceptable and should be reduced. This, and perhaps a desire to get ahead of 
regulatory changes, resulted in some properties reducing their nutrient discharges a round 
earlier than strictly necessary (however, another property converted to dairy early to make 
money while s/he could and then went back to forestry when nutrient limits were imposed). 
These could be simply different responses to perceived risks rather than a perception of 
“social unacceptability”, although because the latter can influence policy the two are not 
unrelated. More in-depth research would be required to understand better these influences on 
behaviour.  
In a related comment, a participant said that it is not socially acceptable to have high 
discharges from one property even if it is legally compliant and within a total cap, because 
environmentalists will be ‘looking over the fence’ and pointing fingers. The research team 
explained that in real life, local limits might still be needed to protect local streams etc. in 
addition to an overall limit for a catchment. This was reflected in the simulation by having 
two zones, each with its own limit and constraints on transfers between the two. It is 
important that the relevant limits have been identified and are in place. An example was cited 
from Lake Taupo, where one dairy farmer has intensified by purchasing nitrogen allowances. 
Is the council satisfied that this will not cause unacceptable local effects? 
A common observation from several workshops was that participants tended to fix on a 
strategy and then stay with it, which led to some missed opportunities. For example, most 
farm properties sought to increase production and therefore wanted to buy allowances. They 
tended not to think about whether they could make more money by reducing output and 
selling allowances. The district council and pulp mill, on the other hand, tended to focus on 
funding mitigation measures by selling allowances but in some cases should have been trying 
to buy units from farmers to avoid costly mitigation measures. 
As some participants noted, it is difficult to identify a viable strategy when the market value 
of units is unclear, as is the case with new markets and markets subject to volatility. The 
value of allowances might take a few years to become clear and some water users will be 
slow to focus on the implications of MBIs for their operations. 
So while MBIs are likely to lead to more efficient use of water and nutrient capacity, this 
might happen gradually rather than quickly. And, Round 5, when Dairy1 failed to obtain N 
units in the auction, showed that if water users don’t understand new policy developments 
and are slow to respond (or too quick, if actions are not well considered), it can prove costly 
to them. 
Finally, some participants raised the prospect of a ‘cooperative agency’ to purchase nutrient 
units on behalf of farmers. This would protect milk supply to the factory, could counter any 
market dominance by would-be water barons, and could also help to ensure environmental 
goals are met, e.g. by limiting how many any one farmer gets. There is some precedence for 
this with fisheries quota: fish processing companies purchased quota from inshore fishermen 
in part to protect company investments in processing capacity (Sinner & Fenemor 2005). The 
 
 
processing sector was not cooperatively owned, however, and this development was not seen 
favourably by many fishers, who had to lease catching rights from the processing companies. 
 
8. Actual vs ‘optimal’ results  
We used linear programming software5 to find the maximum possible financial returns for 
the scenarios and compared these with the results achieved in the simulations. In Figure 3, the 
blue bar represents the maximum financial returns available if allowances are not transferable 
between properties. The optimal returns, shown in green, assumed that water and discharges 
were freely transferable and hence could be used for the highest financial return, whereas in 
the simulations this was constrained in some cases by the non-tradeability of units and, where 
units were tradeable, by participants not making the financially optimal trades (assuming 
participants were seeking to do this). The red bar shows the amount by which trading enabled 
gains over the “no trading” benchmark. Results thus need to be interpreted in context of the 
constraints imposed each round and whether trading was available (e.g. scenarios 11 and 15 
had no trading).  
In the simulations, trading improved financial performance and, in general, participants 
managed to get close to optimal results when only water was constrained, and it was 
tradeable. Adding nutrient constraints lowered the maximum returns possible and made it 
noticeably more difficult to realise profit-maximising transactions. That said, performance 
tended to improve over time and the returns with three constraints in UW#3 were similar to 
returns with two constraints in UW#2 (although changes to profit schedules for UW#3 mean 
that the results are not directly comparable). 
 
                                                          
5
 See www.ampl.com and Fourer et al. (2002).  
Participant comments from Upper Waikato #3 
Trying to meet multiple objectives is very complex. Farmers will need to have profit optimisation 
tools. 
Lots of effort needed to find optimum, but I want to focus on my CORE business. 
Blind auction is difficult – easier to talk to other bidders. 
Water is cheap – Nutrients cost! Easier with incremental changes but only if you know likely 
policy changes ahead. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Optimal versus actual financial results from Waikato simulations (scenario labels on 
horizontal axis: first digit is workshop number, second digit is round number, e.g. 16 is 
workshop 1, round 6). Due to changes in profit schedules, results from UW#3 are not directly 
comparable to results from UW#1 and UW#2. 
 
 
9. Discussion 
9.1. Is the environment protected? 
MBIs are best suited for improving the economic efficiency of freshwater management, for 
which there are also environmental and socio-cultural objectives.  Environmental objectives 
will be met largely by regional councils establishing and enforcing clear limits for both water 
quality and quantity under the RMA. These requirements exist whether MBIs or purely 
administrative approaches are employed. As seen in the simulations, environmental 
objectives can be achieved by setting and enforcing a cap on water use and discharges. 
However, MBIs can influence the achievement of environmental objectives in the following 
ways. 
Firstly, increased transferability of water permits can result in increased use if so-called 
‘sleeper permits’ are transferred and activated. This can cause water quality and/or flows and 
levels to decline, as occurred in Rounds 2 and 3 of the UW#1 simulation. Increased use is not 
necessarily a problem if the total amount allocated is consistent with the community’s water 
quality and quantity objectives. 
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Secondly, if not anticipated and addressed in policy design, transfers of permits can result in 
use being concentrated in small areas (‘hot spots’), perhaps with unacceptable environmental 
effects. This can be addressed by regional plan rules that define the zones within which 
permits can be transferred and that set limits for each zone. This was demonstrated in the 
Waikato simulations for this project, where separate upstream limits protected river condition 
in the upstream zone. This reinforces the point that it is the setting of environmental limits, 
including for specific parts of a catchment where necessary, that is the main determinant of 
whether environmental objectives are met. If a water take or discharge has the potential, by 
itself, to cause unacceptable effects on a water body or another user, these effects should be 
controlled through conditions of use on that site. That is, they would be part of a site or use 
consent rather than part of the water entitlement or discharge allowance (Sinner and Fenemor, 
2007). 
Thirdly, water use charges or discharge fees can be used when necessary as a complement to 
limits to raise revenue for environmental mitigation, e.g. for historical (‘legacy’) impacts, 
while limits address current pressures. This approach was demonstrated in both the Hawke’s 
Bay and Waikato simulations. (Charges could be used as a primary instrument for pursuing 
environmental objectives, but that option provides less assurance that environmental 
objectives will be achieved, and was not pursued in this study.) 
9.2. Efficiency 
The Waikato simulations included the ability for a hydro company to trade a portion of its 
flow allowance with farmers and other abstractive users. This was reasonably straightforward 
within the simplified catchment used, and participants commented that the presence of a 
ready buyer and seller of water permits made it much easier to adjust land use in response to 
nutrient caps. That is, farming participants could focus on obtaining (or selling) the necessary 
nutrient allowances, aware that water could be bought or sold for a known price. In practice, 
existing consents for hydroelectric facilities might need to be amended to specify conditions 
that allow for trading while ensuring that releases provide for ecological requirements and 
downstream interests. 
9.3. Roles of Information, Brokerage and Facilitation 
Provision of simple systems to facilitate transfers of water allocations received support from 
participants. Action could be prioritised on facilitating temporary transfers (e.g. leases), and 
with limited additional work could also facilitate permanent transfers. One important design 
element is Permitted Activity rules to allow exchanges of water among users within a 
management zone, subject to notification of the transfer to the council. The water use or 
discharge activity itself would still require a resource consent, to ensure appropriate 
monitoring and reporting, but transfers could be permitted subject to notification. We 
recommend investigation of how a simple web-based system could facilitate this process. 
Greenhalgh and Selman (2011), based on an international review, noted a large variation in 
the market mechanisms used in water quality trading programmes and a shift over time away 
from bilateral trading to exchanges and third-party brokers or pools. They attributed this to 
 
 
the high transaction costs of early trading programmes and the desire to simplify and 
streamline the process. This could be achieved, they suggested, by the development of 
standardised regulatory documents (i.e. plan provisions and consents), ‘model’ contracts for 
sale and purchase, and mechanisms to facilitate trades and approve them quickly. These are 
useful observations for facilitating MBI implementation in New Zealand also. 
In the Waikato and Hawke’s Bay simulations, participants seemed to prefer bilateral 
negotiation and transactions and some found the process of bidding into a centralised market 
rather confusing. Nonetheless, we consider that this is primarily a matter of users learning 
how these markets work. One of the benefits of a centralised market is that it reveals prices 
across all participants, rather than from just independent bilateral agreements. Bilateral 
trading can still be available for those who prefer this, and even these users will benefit from 
the price discovery provided by a central market mechanism, especially where there is limited 
experience and hence poorly informed expectations about starting market prices. Sinner and 
Crengle (2006) found that participants, with some coaching, learned within a few rounds how 
to formulate bids to a uniform price market. 
9.4. Charges to Promote Efficient Use of Water 
We also explored charges as a complement to transferability, mostly as a mechanism to raise 
revenue for mitigation but also to provide another signal for efficient resource use. In theory, 
the value of an allowance as revealed by trading is sufficient to motivate scrutiny of resource 
use, but in reality farmers and others have many things to focus on and the opportunity cost 
of water allowances might not be top of the list. 
A charge on water use or nutrient discharges might help to increase attention to the 
opportunity cost of allowances. As was seen in the UW#3 simulation, a penalty charge for 
‘excessive’ nutrient loss got users’ attention because it was seen by some participants as a 
sign of community disapproval. 
Charges could also be an efficient way to achieve environmental objectives. This could apply 
in over-allocated catchments in which allocations are being reduced gradually over time, or 
where some mitigation actions are most efficiently funded and coordinated centrally rather 
than at a property level. Charging activities that cause adverse effects, such as water use and 
discharges, is economically more efficient than taxing personal or company income. 
When combined with transferability, charges are unlikely to detract from long-run efficiency 
if set below the market value of allowances (i.e. the value of allowances in the absence of 
charges). There could be a problem in the short term if charges put pressure on producers’ 
balance sheets, e.g. if a user has a marginal operation and has borrowed assuming there 
would be no charges for using water. This suggests that charges of this magnitude should be 
announced well in advance or phased in over time. 
Charges can be applied either to the amount of water used (or nutrients discharged) or to the 
amount of allowances held. A user incurs some opportunity cost in holding unused units, and 
 
 
the environment does benefit from unused permits, so it is probably preferable to charge for 
allowances used rather than held. 
9.5. Social and Cultural Objectives 
MBIs will affect social and cultural relationships with fresh water. For example, if transfers 
do not require approval from the regional council, iwi and hapū will not have the opportunity 
to make submissions on those transfers and they will find it harder to maintain an overview of 
how and by whom water is being used. To reflect tangata whenua values and interests, 
therefore, it is important to ensure that iwi and hapū are actively involved in drafting and 
potentially in implementing the relevant plan provisions. 
MBIs, whether transferable permits or water use charges, can have implications for the 
distribution of wealth, from little change to potentially significant redistribution. This is most 
often experienced as a debate over initial allocations of water permits or discharge 
allowances but can also arise with charges. Initial allocation based on existing use 
(‘grandparenting’) protects the wealth of existing users but can, especially where new units 
are being created (e.g. allowances for a nutrient limit), also have a negative impact on 
development opportunities and hence asset values of owners of undeveloped land. 
Expectations of grandparenting can also encourage uneconomic intensification (i.e. that is 
financially viable only if there is no cost for nutrient discharges) that is expensive to address.  
Conversely, allocations based on land capability or another averaging approach (assuming 
that some existing users will be allocated insufficient allowances to maintain current 
production) protect the opportunities of those with undeveloped land but at the expense of 
existing users, creating potential issues with stranded capital assets. And because land 
capability and ‘best practice’ will vary by property in ways impossible to reflect in allocation 
rules, some landholders are likely to be unfairly penalised by these approaches.  
This dilemma is not unique to MBIs, however. Any policy that involves an environmental 
limit, as required by the NPS, will also require a decision about how that limit will be shared 
across landowners and users and some will have their economic opportunities constrained. 
Transferable permits at least provide a mechanism for users who are short of allowances to 
obtain more. These issues were only touched on briefly in this project, but in the UW#2 
simulation, for instance, one of the farmer participants protested about the financial impact of 
average allocations and charges. Transitional policies, discussed further below, offer one 
means of addressing such concerns. 
MBIs, and more generally policies to assign economic values to ecosystem goods and 
services, are also sometimes seen as representing the commodification of water, bringing 
water more firmly into the capitalist economy and undermining more spiritual or holistic 
relationships with water bodies (Robertson, 2012). This may be unavoidable given the vital 
role that water plays in modern economies, the current pressures on freshwater systems and 
aspirations for further economic development. It is also no different to the situation for land, 
for which similar cultural and spiritual relationships exist, yet which is allocated through a 
market system. Putting an explicit value on water use and nutrient discharge will discourage 
 
 
wasteful practices and incentivise more efficient use and makes more transparent the 
economic consequences of social and cultural uses of water. 
Cultural norms and institutions that emerged under conditions of abundant clean and clear 
water are unlikely to be able to manage the current level of abstraction and discharges, 
let alone meet future aspirations. We note, however, that the Crown and iwi are engaged in 
conversations about new institutions, such as the co-governance arrangements for the 
Waikato River, that might be able to provide for cultural values while also being flexible 
enough to cope with modern pressures and demands on freshwater systems. 
Water use charges or discharge fees are one example of a new arrangement that could be used 
to further these goals. Revenue from charges can be used to address socio-cultural issues such 
as hapū or in-stream users who have been adversely affected by discharges and abstractions 
(Sinner and Scherzer, 2007). Giving iwi or other civil society groups a role in deciding how 
such revenue is to be used could help to restore traditional relationships with fresh water in a 
way that goes beyond the transactional focus of MBIs. 
A further example is the opportunity for iwi to collaborate in water user groups that develop 
collective strategies for meeting water quality objectives, and maintaining environmental 
flow regimes as an alternative or complement to more formal transfers or trading. They may 
also wish to participate in water sharing or rostering discussions, to be assured that 
environmental objectives are being met. 
10. Conclusions 
The simulations provided an opportunity for stakeholders to experience a number of different 
policy scenarios for tradable allowances and charges for water abstraction and nutrient 
discharge. Given the limited number of participants and replications and the simplified 
catchment and profit schedules, the results should not be seen as predictions of what would 
happen under these market-based instruments except in a very general sense. Rather, the 
simulations provided a platform for discussion and consideration of questions such as what 
might lead to different outcomes in real life, what concerns stakeholders have, and how such 
policies could be improved to make them more acceptable. Participants also said that the 
simulations were a valuable learning experience for them. 
In general terms, the ability to transfer or trade water or discharge allowances relatively 
freely (i.e. with low transaction costs and no need to seek regulatory approval) enabled users 
to increase the total financial returns across the catchment while meeting environmental 
objectives. This provides flexibility for new entrants and new uses of water, addressing the 
re-allocation issue, and helps to mitigate the financial impact of setting and enforcing new 
limits that are below existing use levels. Participants generally supported making water 
permits and discharge allowances more easily transferable. There were concerns, however, 
about the possibility of “water barons” and Maori respondents wanted to see ownership 
issues resolved. 
 
 
When only water abstractions were limited, and permits were tradable, participants managed 
to realise most of the potential gains from trade. This was noticeably more difficult when a 
nutrient constraint was added and even more so when a second nutrient was constrained. In 
these latter cases, participants often had to negotiate two or more transactions to buy or sell 
the desired amount of allowances to enable their intended land use change. After one or two 
rounds of multiple constraints, however, they learned who was interested in buying and 
selling and the prevailing prices for different kinds of allowances, and financial returns 
improved. 
It was also evident that, even in a small room with only ten participants, social networks 
influenced trading. Participants preferred bilateral transactions and some found the process of 
bidding into a centralised market confusing. Nonetheless, we consider that this is primarily a 
matter of users gaining confidence in market mechanisms.  
Trading within one’s social network can contribute to inefficient outcomes when permits sell 
for less than the true market value and are purchased by those who put them to sub-optimal 
use. One of the benefits of a centralised market is that it reveals prices across all participants, 
rather than from just independent bilateral agreements. Bilateral trading can still be available 
for those who prefer this, and even these users will benefit from the price discovery provided 
by a central market mechanism, especially where there is limited experience and hence 
poorly informed expectations about starting market prices.  
Other social considerations also influenced simulation outcomes in that participants did not 
always seek to maximise financial returns. In some cases, participants chose not to intensify, 
or to de-intensify, for what might be termed “lifestyle” reasons. These choices are not 
necessarily economically inefficient, because people making such choices might put a higher 
value on the lifestyle choice than on the financial return available through other options. 
Charges on water use or discharge allowances are compatible with ‘cap and trade’ policies. 
The reasons for applying charges are mostly to do with sharing of the costs and benefits of 
limited access to water and discharges, e.g. providing a return to the community and 
addressing concerns about windfall gains from access to public resources. There are also 
circumstances in which charges might be used in conjunction with cap and trade to promote 
more economically efficient outcomes, e.g. where mitigation can be achieved at less expense 
collectively than on individual properties. 
Market-based instruments can be expected to increase the financial returns from land and 
water use within environmental limits. The extent and pace of that improvement is likely to 
vary by catchment, and to increase over time as stakeholders become more familiar with new 
policy settings and as the value of water allowances becomes clearer. Central and local 
government can facilitate this process by offering learning opportunities, encouraging 
brokerage services and providing centralised mechanisms for buying and selling of 
allowances.  
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Appendix 
The Upper Waikato simulations included the following entities: 
Upstream catchment (Lake 1) 
Dairy 2 A ‘standard practice’ dairy farm, this property started with 1 surplus unit 
of water and relatively high nutrient losses. Farm has option of 
converting to ‘best practice’ to reduce nutrient runoff. 
Sheep & Beef A ‘long established’ sheep and beef farm, this property has excellent 
potential for conversion to dairy or arable farming, but started with no 
water permits and low nutrient discharges. 
Forestry 1 A recently harvested forestry block with potential to convert to best-
practice dairy or to sheep and beef. 
Forestry 2 A recently harvested forestry block with potential to convert to best-
practice dairy or to sheep and beef. 
Downstream catchment (Lake 2) 
Dairy 1 A recently established farm using best practice, this property started with 
a limited water allocation and hence low intensity. 
Dairy 3 A ‘standard practice’ dairy farm with relatively high nutrient losses; 
converting to ‘best practice’ would reduce these. 
Arable A productive operation with the potential to reduce relatively high 
nutrient losses. Conversion to dairy also possible. 
District Council Council has options to reduce water use and nutrient discharges, but 
these would require some investment and the council is trying to keep 
rates down. 
Pulp Mill The mill has some investment options that would reduce its nutrient 
discharges, or it can reduce output.  
Hydro company The hydro company makes a profit from water going through its turbines 
and could purchase additional units. It started with 5 units of water that it 
could sell to other users. 
River Trust The second workshop had a trust that received revenue from water 
charges and invested this in measures to improve river condition. This 
was done by the simulation manager rather than being a separate role in 
the scenarios. 
 
 
